Logically prior

Filed Under (dee dee's posts) by dee dee on 18-09-2006

I had promised to address Alexander Rodriguez’ charge of my alleged failure to understand the concept of “logically prior.” There is a lot that I can write on this, and I have been reflecting on various ways to address this gross (no I am not alleging intentional) misrepresentation and/or misunderstanding of my position. To put Alexander’s objection in other words, he is saying that I am proving my conclusion by assuming from the beginning (a priori). He is accusing me of logical circularity. To put it in another form:

If A, then A

If that is what I was doing, that would be in fact ridiculous. However, this is somewhat frustrating because I have gone completely out of my way in my articles to be explicit about what I was doing which is definitely not the above. For instance from the synopsis of my “‘Grave’ Heresy” article:

Is hyper-preterism merely yet another valid view within the spectrum of Christianity? How should the Church react when facing this radically different teaching? Is this a cause for Christian tolerance or doctrinal division? The Church has consistently held that certain core beliefs, including those denied by the hyper-preterists, are definitional and foundation to the Christian faith. Further, the Scripture gives specific examples demonstrating that serious errors regarding the resurrection are a line of demarcation for Christian faith and praxis. In the final analysis, this teaching cuts out the heart of redemption and is not acceptable as part of the spectrum of Christian faith.

Without going and looking at everything (in addition to the above) that I actually said before, I will simply restate here and hope that this restatement will bring some understanding to my opponents, though quite frankly, my opponents (i.e. the hyperpreterists in this instance) are not my intended readers, and oddly enough, my intended readers seem to get the point with very little difficulty which leads me to believe that the problem is not in clarity of communication, but in unwillingness to understand due to the ramifications to one’s own position.

However, here it goes:

If a person, through whatever means that they have found persuasive, is committed that hyperpreterism is not true, then that person cannot show theological tolerance to hyperpreterism as an acceptable, though incorrect, expression of Christian faith. This stands in contrast to the other “controversies” within the Church, for example, an amillennial Christian may believe that a premillennial Christian is wrong while still accepting that this expression does not invalidate the person as holding Christian faith. There is nothing absolutely and inexorably inherent in premillennialism that denies any of the very few factors that define Christianity, and that without which Christianity is not present.

As seen above, I am not simply then saying something as inane as, if someone believes that hyperpreterism is a damnable heresy, then hyperpreterism is a damnable heresy. I am in fact saying that if someone rejects hyperpreterism as being true, is it a damnable heresy or is it some other form or error? That is my point. Therefore, I am not saying:

If A, then A

Now Alexander’s objection would further touch the fact that the actors in my scenarios have already “presumed” that hyperpreterism is wrong, and that is the fact at issue. But that is not the fact at issue to me. I do not have to start every argument from the most basic of propositions. It is perfectly valid to select an audience that already has something in common with the speaker. An atheist who attends a Church service does not have a valid objection as to the Christians in the audience that they should not follow the moral directions of their Pastor because their Pastor did not provide an elaborate proof for the existence of God or the authority of Scripture. To the Christians in the audience, they already share those ideas. They do not have to be proved in every instance. The problem is that the hyperpreterist is smuggling in their position that they are part of the Christian picture, and to then insist that their starting position be the subject of the controversy. But as surprising as it may be to the hyperpreterists, there are those who have already made that determination and now that person must take on the weighty task of what their position must be towards the inclusion or exclusion of hyperpreterism from the right hand of fellowship. That is the point. I have nothing to prove to hyperpreterists as they are not my intended audience.

Alexander then went on to show his complete misunderstanding by claiming that my argument engages in worthless hypotheticals. That is patently absurd, and that is another smuggling in of equivocal phrases (the “other” being referred to is my prior blog about Roderick’s tactics in a certain debate). When someone makes the claim or complaint that the other person is using “hypotheticals” that evokes images of impossibilities or incredible situations that would never happen in real life. But that is not the case here. The “hypothetical” in question is the addressing of the argument towards a group of people that DOES exist! That group being those who have determined that they do not believe that hyperpreterism is true. It is not a “hypothetical” in positing a situation that may exist but does not at the present time, it is an exclusionary clause that narrows a potential audience down only to those who share a certain belief, to then take that belief to a logical conclusion. By his objections, which are complete and utter red herrings, it is shown that Alexander, viewing this most charitably, has foundationally misunderstood the point, and thus fails to address it at every turn, and then, whether intentionally or unintentionally, to me it does not matter, create diversions.

I have demonstrated by the above that I most certainly do you understand the concept of logically prior. But my argument is not trying to prove that hyperpreterism is wrong. My argument is making as its specific focus for those who believe that hyperpreterism is wrong (whether they are right about that or not!), what their position must be. And hyperpreterists have conceded this point. David Green has conceded this point. And ironically, the person named Jared in which the hyperpreterist have been flouting as someone who allegedly (”told Gene what’s what” - paraphrase) has conceded this. He stated, a comment which is conveniently ignored in the hyperpreterist whoha (from Jared’s email to Gene Cook which was read on the air during Gene’s 8/28/06 program - link to that portion of the show forthcoming):

If the FP [ full preterist - i.e. hyperpreterist] View is wrong, then those who teach it are teaching a damnable heresy, and fall under the same condemnation of Hymaneus and Philetus.

Jared gets it.

“Keith Mathison was correct on this point: If futurism is true, then [full] preterism is definitely (not “possibly,” as I said) a damnable doctrine.

David green gets it.

Alexander, so far, has not gotten it.

In one sense I find it unfortunate, and I actually considered making this more generic, that I am dealing specifically with the argument by Alexander. This is not something that is unique to him which is one reason why I did not use his exact quotes, but paraphrased them, and I do not believe did violence to what he actually said (and I am sure I will be informed if I did so that corrections can be made), but rather tried to make it more relevant to other people who would have the same misunderstanding. I decided not to generalize it and omit Alexander’s name lest he interpret this as a rebuff of him to turn him into a non-person who made an objection. Instead, I found it preferable to acknowledge that this blog was initiated as a response to his recent comments, but it does go far beyond that, to the others who have made similar objections.

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